This proposal introduces a long-term locking and commitment framework for Super Validators
(SVs) on the Canton Network.
SVs may elect to lock a portion of their aggregate lifetime earned SV rewards in order to
maintain forward Super Validator Weight. This lock creates a visible, on-chain commitment to
the network and directly ties SV influence to long-term alignment.
SV Weight is earned based on the percentage of lifetime SV rewards that are actively locked.
SVs that choose not to participate, or that fall below required lock thresholds, earn proportionally
reduced SV Weight or none at all.
This framework is designed to:
Align SV incentives with the long-term success of the network
Replace reputational assurances with cryptographic proof of alignment
Reduce incentives for short-term or opportunistic behavior
Participation in this framework is voluntary. The consequences of participation or
non-participation are transparent, objective, and applied uniformly across all Super Validators.
2. Specification
This CIP defines an SV locking framework whereby a specified percentage of an SV’s
aggregate lifetime earned SV rewards must be actively locked in order to earn Super Validator
Weight.
Key characteristics:
The framework applies to lifetime SV earnings, including both historical rewards earned
prior to CIP activation and all future rewards earned thereafter
Locking is evaluated on an aggregate SV basis, not per-validator instance
Only actively locked Canton Coin (CC) counts toward the SV weighting algorithm
During design of the implementation of automated rewards locking it became clear that we needed to spell out which enforcement steps would be automated, and how automated enforcement would work.
I'd like to propose the following text be added to CIP-0105 and CIP-0116 to describe automated enforcement:
CIP-0105:
Automated Onchain Weight Reduction
Super Validators that fall below a locking threshold will have a time-configured (default: seven-day) grace period. During this grace period the Super Validator’s weight remains the same. If the Super Validator raises its locked amount above the threshold during the grace period, it does not lose any Super Validator weight. It continues to mint rewards at the higher weight, and does not lose any weight going forward from that time. The SV weight reduction grace period is a variable that may be altered by vote of the Super Validators. If the Super Validator does not raise its locked amount above the threshold during the grace period, its weight will be automatically lowered by the percentage specified in above for the given threshold and calendar timeline. This weight lowering will be implemented via an automated onchain Super Validator vote, with the resulting Super Validator reward weight value recorded onchain. If the Super Validator does not lock sufficient CC to restore its higher reward threshold within 30 days of the time it first falls below threshold, an automated onchain Super Validator vote will mark that Super Validator as prohibited from returning to the prior, higher, weight via an automated vote, even if they increase their locked CC. If automated weight reduction results in the SV having a weight of zero, then the Super Validator will be offboarded from the quorum, and removed from the Global Synchronizer, via the separate process defined in CIP-0111. Automated weight reduction does not preclude the Super Validators from separately voting to raise the specific SV’s weight via a coordinated, non-automated, onchain vote.
CIP-0116:
Enforcement
Locking requirements must be satisfied continuously
If locking falls below required thresholds, Featured App status is immediately removed. This will be enforced onchain automatically in the following way:
Featured Applications that fail to lock the required Canton Coin will have their Featured Application status revoked onchain via an automated onchain Super Validator vote, after a grace period (default: seven days). If featured applications restore their lock within the grace period, their featured application status will not be revoked. The length of the grace period will be configurable and may be changed via a coordinated (non-automated) onchain vote by the Super Validators. Featured Applications that return to the required locking level within the grace period will not lose their featured application status.
Unlike with Super Validators, there is no 30-day recovery period for Featured Applications. Featured Applications that lose their featured status after the 7-day grace period must re-apply via the off-chain Featured Application approval process, followed by a coordinated, non-automated, onchain vote by the Super Validators.
Super Validator operators may also vote to unfeature any application via a standard proposal mechanism, following existing governance procedures. SV Operators must respond within 30 minutes or less from initiation of a coordinated onchain proposal to unfeature an application.
From: cip-vote@... <cip-vote@...>
On Behalf Of Amanda Martin via lists.sync.global Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2026 2:44 PM To: cip-vote@... Subject: [ext] [cip-votes] [Updated] CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
Hello Super Validator Node Owners, The vote on CIP-0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework has concluded and the proposal has been approved
by the Super Validators. The approved CIP text is available here: https: //github. com/canton-foundation/cips/blob/main/cip-0105/cip-0105. md
Hello Super Validator Node Owners,
The vote on CIP-0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework has concluded and the proposal has been
approved by the Super Validators.
This vote establishes the Super Validator locking framework and enables the operational process defined in the CIP.
Transitional Enforcement Start
There is a request to modify the transitional enforcement period with a recommendation to begin on:
April 16, 2026 at 12:00 AM UTC
This timeline provides time for Super Validators to prepare their locking structures and confirm the required information with the Foundation.
To vote to approve this new date of enfocement please reply with:
<SV Name> votes <in favor | not in favor>
If you believe any change made after this announcement is substantive, please vote not in favor and include your reasoning in the vote response.
This e-mail and any attachments may contain information that is confidential and proprietary and otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, do not read, duplicate or redistribute it by any means. Please immediately
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SVs must be able to lock CC from their preferred wallet or qualified custodian
Locks can be made across a number of wallets and positions, they don’t have to be held
in one lump sum
Withdrawal of locked CC follows a mandatory vesting-based model:
An SV may initiate an unlock of any size at any time
Once initiated, 1 / 365.25 of the requested unlock amount vests and becomes liquid
each day
Only the fully locked (non-vesting) portion counts towards maintaining SV Weight
All locked CC, including any balance above the applicable tier threshold, must be withdrawn through the vesting process
Any withdrawal of locked CC that circumvents vesting constitutes a lock violation (the sole exception being the Lock Substitution provision defined in the operational guidelines)
3. Motivation
The Canton community knows that Super Validators are deeply committed to the network. Many
have invested years of engineering effort, institutional credibility, and commercial relationships
to make Canton successful.
However, as Canton becomes increasingly visible to external markets, reputation alone is
insufficient. Public blockchains are evaluated not just on technology, but on:
Who governs them
Whether incentives favor short-term extraction or long-term stewardship
Today, Canton relies primarily on reputation to communicate this alignment. This framework
provides a way to make that commitment publicly observable and cryptographically verifiable.
This proposal does not impose an obligation on Super Validators. Rather, it creates a
transparent mechanism by which SVs may elect to demonstrate long-term alignment through
durable economic commitments.
The framework preserves freedom of choice while ensuring that network influence increasingly accrues to those willing to make long-term commitments to Canton.
4. SV Locking Requirement
To earn forward Super Validator Weight, an SV must actively lock a defined percentage of its
aggregate lifetime earned SV rewards.
This includes all historical SV rewards earned prior to CIP activation
This includes all SV rewards earned after CIP activation
Locking is evaluated across the SV’s aggregate position
Only actively locked CC counts toward the SV weighting algorithm.
For any organization that has or does operate more than one Super Validator, the lock up
calculation is based on the aggregate lifetime earnings of any/all operating SVs. Any reduction
in weighting will apply to total SV Weight for that organization. For the avoidance of doubt this
provision applies to SVs identified as Digital Asset -1, DigitalAsset -2 Cumberland -1 and
Cumberland -2.
5. SV Locking and SV Weight Schedule
SV Weight going forward is affected by the percentage of aggregate lifetime SV earnings that
are actively locked.
The maximum required lock declines over time. SV Weight is awarded according to the
schedule presented below..
Year from Activation
Tier 1 (Earns 100%)
Tier 2 (Earns 60%)
Tier 3 (Earns 40%)
Start
70%
45%
35%
+1 Year
65%
50%
N/A
+2 Years
60%
N/A
N/A
+3 Years
55%
N/A
N/A
Example 1 :
SV with Weight 10
Locks 70% of historical earnings
Auto-locks 70% of forward earnings
Earns rewards associated with Weight 10 each reward interval
Example 2 :
SV with Weight 10
Locks 45% of historical earnings
Auto-locks 45% of forward earnings
Earns rewards associated with Weight 6 each reward interval
If the lowest tier threshold is less than or equal to zero, that tier is removed and any SV below
the next tier earns zero SV Weight.
The Lock-up requirement will automatically terminate 30 days after the date of next step down in
rewards/halving currently forecast to occur late summer 2029.
6. Under-Locked SV Weight Enforcement
To prevent opportunistic behavior and reward stable, long-term commitments, the following
enforcement rules apply:
If an SV becomes under-locked relative to its current tier:
The under-locked portion of its SV Weight is removed from the active SV pool
within 7 days
The SV has 30 days from the initial under-lock event to restore its lock and return to the
higher tier
If the SV fails to re-lock within 30 days:
The removed SV Weight is permanently removed from the SV pool
The SV may not reclaim that weight in the future
This mechanism:
Limits gaming of SV Weight based on market conditions
Creates incentives for SVs that maintain consistent, long-term locks
Example 3 :
SV with Weight 10 and historical earnings of 1b CC
Locks 70% (700m CC) of historical earnings
Auto-locks 70% of forward earnings
Earns rewards associated with Weight 10 each reward interval
After 1 day, unlocks 100m CC
100m/365.25 unlock every 24 hours for the next year
Now has locked 60% of historical earnings
Falls into Tier 2 and earns rewards associated with Weight 6 SV going forward
After 10 days, relocks 100m CC
Now has locked 70% of historical earnings
Returns to Tier1 and earns rewards associated with Weight 10 SV going forward
Later decides to unlock 100m CC permanently
After 7 days, W4 is temporarily removed from the SV pool
After 30 days, W4 permanently removed from the SV poo
7. Locking Infrastructure and Custody
The implementation of this CIP must support locking from:
Self-custody wallets
Institutional custodians
Qualified third-party custody providers
SVs must not be forced into holding their CC on their validator, a specific wallet, custodian, or
custody model to participate.
The locking mechanism must allow transparent verification of locked balances while preserving
operational flexibility for SVs.
It must be possible to lock from multiple wallets, custodians, and PartyIds and meet the locking
threshold requirements in aggregate.
Example 4 :
SV with Weight 10
Locks 10% at Custodian1, Locks 20% at Custodian2, Locks 20% in their Validator, Locks
20% in Wallet1 (aggregate 70% locked)
Auto-distributes proportionally and locks 70% in aggregate of forward earnings
Earns rewards associated with Weight 10 each reward interval
8. Implementation
Phase 1 — Transitional Enforcement
Begins within 30 days of CIP approval
SVs disclose a segregated PartyId(s) holding locked CC to the Foundation
SV Weight evaluated weekly
Under-locked enforcement rules apply
Phase 2 — On-Chain Enforcement
Activates upon deployment of CC locking contracts to MainNet
Only on-chain locked CC counts
Vesting-based unlocks apply automatically
SV Weight updates continuously
9. Exemptions
None.
This framework applies uniformly to all Super Validators.
No exemptions are provided for the Foundation, ecosystem funds, or any other entities.
Uniform application eliminates subjective decision-making and ensures the framework remains
objective, predictable, and governable over time.
Copyright
This CIP is licensed under CC0-1.0: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal
Building on Andrew's definitions above, attached (and below) is a document with proposed detailed Supplier Substitution workflows during manual Phase1, for discussion on May 6th (tomorrow) Tokenomics committee meeting
Thanks
CIP-105 : Supplier Substitution Liquid credit markets for locked and vesting CC are beneficial to long term growth of Canton. While complying with network rules, allowing duration exposure to be actively distributed based on CC supplier’s risk requirements will increase investment activity by enabling competitive funding for SVs and FAs.
Proposed Requirements:
Allow for substitution of CC supplier partyID in both Actively Locked + Vesting states
Continuous tier weight credit during/after substitution (no tier changes permitted)
Original supplier receives immediate liquid CC, not subject to vesting period
for Vesting positions, release schedule/sizes and final ‘maturity date’ are preserved
Same workflow for both SV + FA locking
3rd party delegation operational workflows (Phase1 manual)
Activating Initial Lock
Supplier (Delegator) holds CC in unique partyID (lockedWallet)
Canton Foundation is provided the below variables via email to CF Operations team:
CC size
targetPartyID (SV/FA beneficiary)
lockedWallet partyID (supplier)
unlockWallet partyID (supplier)
supplier institution name
contact names/emails for both parties
Quorum agreement of the delegation by both parties
Proposed: 3rd party / marketplaces can provide initial instructions - subject to quorum confirmation (via group email cc)
Supplier Substitution of Actively Locked CC
Existing supplier holds CC in lockedWallet, with tier credit currently attributed to targetPartyID
New supplier holds CC in unique partyID (new_lockedWallet)
Packaged instruction submitted to Canton Foundation Operations via email (can be provided by 3rd party / marketplace):
CC size of substitution
new_lockedWallet partyID (new supplier ; requesting new_lock)
Subject to validating the below Enforcement Formula:
existing lockedWallet CC is instantly released to liquid state (100% moved to unlockWallet)
new_lockedWallet enters actively Locked state
no change to SV/FA attribution
Enforcement Formula = same 24 hour window immediate_unlock = min(unlock_amount, recent_locked_amount, total_locked – current_tier_lock) unbonding_unlock = unlock_amount – immediate_unlock Where:
total_locked is the total amount locked at time of the attempted unlock
unlock_amount is the total amount of the attempted unlock
immediate_unlock is the portion of the unlock that is immediately liquid
unbonding_unlock is the portion of the unlock that is subject to the 365 day unbonding period
current_tier_lock is the minimum CC lock threshold for the SV lock tier at the time of the unlock request (i.e., the currently applicable SV lock tier)
recent_locked_amount is the amount locked in the most recent 24-hour (140 round) window
Supplier Substitution of Vesting CC
Existing supplier holds vesting CC in unlockWallet Certain attributes are known and fixed:
Maturity Date = initial unlock date + 365.25 days
CC amount vest per day = initial unlock amount / 365.25
vesting CC does not count towards any tier weight = no targetPartyID / beneficiary
Packaged instruction submitted to Canton Foundation Operations via email (can be provided by 3rd party / marketplace):
CC size of substitution (full or partial)
the offset would be against specified maturity date, as holder/seller of that vesting stream would have needs to offset their specific obligation
As a update: the working group for scoping phase2 Splice requirements has included supplier substitution on both actively locked CC + vesting locked CC
I want to request if there is any feedback on the above process list during phase1 (manual enforcement), so that we can formally move it forward as standard operating procedure. This formalization will be helpful for how 3rd party delegation deals are managed before on-chain contracts are implemented.
Thanks
JL
James Lang
May 18, 2026
In addition, the ability to transfer locked tokens among custodians, exchanges, and self-custody solutions should be formalized. Locking Canton via a 3rd party vendor should not result in that vendor being locked in.
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
On Behalf Of Luke Farrell via lists.sync.global Sent: Monday, May 18, 2026 11:23 AM To: cip-discuss@... Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-0105: Super Validator (SV) Staking
As a update: the working group for scoping phase2 Splice requirements has included supplier substitution on both actively locked CC + vesting locked CC
I want to request if there is any feedback on the above process list during phase1 (manual enforcement), so that we can formally move it forward as standard operating procedure. This formalization will be helpful for how 3rd party delegation deals are managed
before on-chain contracts are implemented.
Thanks
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VA
Veronica Augustsson
Apr 6, 2026
7RIDGE/C7 votes in favour
Veronica
V E R O N I C A A U G U S T S S O N
/
P A R T N E R
7RIDGE IS A PRIVATE MARKETS ASSET MANAGER INVESTED IN TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGY FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES TO POWER THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
From: cip-vote@... <cip-vote@...>
On Behalf Of Amanda Martin via lists.sync.global Sent: Thursday, 2 April 2026 21:44 To: cip-vote@... Subject: [cip-votes] [Updated] CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
Hello Super Validator Node Owners,
The vote on CIP-0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework has concluded and the proposal has been
approved by the Super Validators.
On Feb 27, 2026, at 2:18 PM, Amanda Martin via lists.sync.global <amanda=canton.foundation@...> wrote:
Hello Super Validator Node Owners, Please find ready for vote: CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework The CIP text as merged in GitHub at the Proposed state a553fa2c713fe461d46eaef824494813f59f3391 No changes
Hello Super Validator Node Owners,
Please find ready for vote: CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
No changes will be made to the CIP text after this announcement other than updating the approval date and status.
Sponsors / Endorsers
* Proof Group – SV Sponsor
* 5North – SV Endorser
Voting Instructions All other operators, please reply with:
<SV Name> votes <in favor | not in favor>
If you believe any change made after this announcement is substantive, please vote not in favor and include your reasoning in the vote response.
This e-mail and any attachments may contain information that is confidential and proprietary and otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, do not read, duplicate or redistribute it by any means. Please immediately delete it and any attachments and notify the sender that you have received it by mistake. Unintended recipients are prohibited from taking action on the basis of information in this e-mail or any attachments. The DRW Companies make no representations that this e-mail or any attachments are free of computer viruses or other defects.
From: cip-vote@... <cip-vote@...> on behalf of Chris Zuehlke via lists.sync.global <czuehlke=drwholdings.com@...> Sent: Sunday, March 1, 2026 2:40:07 PM To: cip-vote@... <cip-vote@...> Cc: cip-vote@... <cip-vote@...> Subject: Re: [cip-votes] CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
Cumberland DRW votes in favor.
On Feb 27, 2026, at 2:18 PM, Amanda Martin via lists.sync.global <amanda=canton.foundation@...> wrote:
Hello Super Validator Node Owners, Please find ready for vote: CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework The CIP text as merged in GitHub at the Proposed state a553fa2c713fe461d46eaef824494813f59f3391 No changes
Hello Super Validator Node Owners,
Please find ready for vote: CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
* The CIP text as merged in GitHub at the Proposed state
a553fa2c713fe461d46eaef824494813f59f3391<https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Furldefense.com%2Fv3%2F__https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcanton-foundation%2Fcips%2Fblob%2Fa553fa2c713fe461d46eaef824494813f59f3391%2Fcip-0105%2Fcip-0105.md__%3B!!EvhwMw!RGeCPcu-92OTmQjs_a8KzgzJzsc-feFXUrj3xZOKlaoqDlubrASRU0R9GT9X0tKuRVy9-u872QSC0F192yvjGVEZA6GCrhMPXcmVv-bL%24&data=05%7C02%7Ckinga.bosse%40mpch.com%7C626eba5476b34d4eed9808de77ca5a90%7Cbe4388bd74ac45f4ba9d8fc852b7023c%7C0%7C0%7C639079908156939480%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=q4xNH5%2BBzYny379zas1fUMuvdr%2Boa6x%2F%2Bm0%2BWJ1faQA%3D&reserved=0>
No changes will be made to the CIP text after this announcement other than updating the approval date and status.
Sponsors / Endorsers
* Proof Group – SV Sponsor
* 5North – SV Endorser
Voting Instructions
All other operators, please reply with:
<SV Name> votes <in favor | not in favor>
If you believe any change made after this announcement is substantive, please vote not in favor and include your reasoning in the vote response.
This e-mail and any attachments may contain information that is confidential and proprietary and otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, do not read, duplicate or redistribute it by any means. Please immediately
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From: cip-vote@... <cip-vote@...>
On Behalf Of Kinga Bosse via lists.sync.global Sent: Sunday, March 01, 2026 8:17 PM To: cip-vote@... Subject: Re: [cip-votes] CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
CAUTION:This email originated from outside of Tradeweb. Do not open
attachments or click on links if you do not recognize the sender or if the content appears unsafe/you cannot verify the content is safe.
Hello Super Validator Node Owners, Please find ready for vote: CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework The CIP text as merged in GitHub at the Proposed state a553fa2c713fe461d46eaef824494813f59f3391 No changes
Hello Super Validator Node Owners,
Please find ready for vote: CIP 0105: Super Validator (SV) Locking & Long-Term Commitment Framework
No changes will be made to the CIP text after this announcement other than updating the approval date and status.
Sponsors / Endorsers
* Proof Group – SV Sponsor
* 5North – SV Endorser
Voting Instructions
All other operators, please reply with:
<SV Name> votes <in favor | not in favor>
If you believe any change made after this announcement is substantive, please vote not in favor and include your reasoning in the vote response.
This e-mail and any attachments may contain information that is confidential and proprietary and otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, do not read, duplicate or redistribute it by any means. Please immediately
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