Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV Program



Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?

 

From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV Program

 

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We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:

Hold CC for some time --> get more CC

The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle).  This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance.  This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.

If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:

1. Create an public investment SV sub-type or category.  These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
2. Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
3. Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
4. Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
5. Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule

We believe that these changes will:

• Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
• Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
• simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
• Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
• Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities

We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.

 

On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:

sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal 

 

if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc 

 

On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:

Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!

From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking.  We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.

If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate.  Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs.  If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool.  We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable.  A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.

Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC.  Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC.  We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales.  Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).

We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance.  If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking.  If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.

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On Mar 19, 2026, at 11:30 AM, James Lang via lists.sync.global <james=libertycityventures.com@...> wrote:



Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?

 

From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV Program

 

You don't often get email from anthony=modulo.finance@.... Learn why this is important

We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:

Hold CC for some time --> get more CC

The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle).  This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance.  This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.

If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:

1. Create an public investment SV sub-type or category.  These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
2. Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
3. Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
4. Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
5. Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule

We believe that these changes will:

• Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
• Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
• simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
• Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
• Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities

We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.

 

On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:

sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal 

 

if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc 

 

On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:

Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!

From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking.  We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.

If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate.  Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs.  If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool.  We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable.  A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.

Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC.  Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC.  We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales.  Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).

We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance.  If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking.  If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.

This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.

Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. When in doubt, contact netGenius.