SV Governance CIPs

Thanks to @Eric for the v0.2 revision .

I am Gustav Arentoft - Leading Ecosystem for Zenith. Before joining Zenith I ran StableLab which was the first professional delegate, and one of the largest governance service providers to DeFi, L2s and L1s. We worked with teams such as AAVE, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, Sky/MakerDAO, Uniswap, Compound and many others. 

I would like to suggest three refinements aimed at how the voting mechanic itself functions as participation broadens beyond the current SV set. Each is framed as an amendment to v0.2 rather than an alternative model.

1. Consolidate the four-option voting model

Under the v0.2 rules:

• Abstain counts as participation but contributes neither to quorum nor outcome

• Do Not Vote appears not to count as participation, and contributes neither to quorum nor outcome

• Only Yes and No count toward outcome

Do Not Vote is therefore strictly dominated by Abstain which has the same impact on quorum (none), same impact on outcome (none), but Do Not Vote is additionally counted as a missed vote for the quarterly participation requirement. There is no scenario in which a rational SV chooses Do Not Vote over Abstain. One of the problems in Governance systems is to get people to vote in the first place, so there is no scenario where someone would go through the trouble of voting without actually choosing Abstain over Do Not Vote. 

Suggested amendment:

For each proposal, SVs choose one of: Yes, No, or Abstain. Failing to record any vote within the voting window is treated as a missed vote for participation purposes. We could also be in situations where SVs accidentally chose Do Not Vote and then receive the penalty for not voting. 

A small simplification that removes a confusing, potentially harmful to SV’s,  redundancy from the proposal.

2. Let Abstain count toward quorum

Closely related to (1). Under v0.2, an SV that participates by selecting Abstain does not contribute to quorum. As the SV set grows and participation broadens, contested or specialized proposals risk gridlock: most SVs participate (to avoid the penalty), but not enough Yes/No weight gathers to clear the 50% quorum threshold. The net effect is that the dominant strategy for any indifferent SV becomes Abstain, and the effective passage bar climbs above the stated 33% of total network weight (50% × 66.7%).

Suggested amendment — separate participation quorum from outcome quorum:

Quorum: (Yes Weight + No Weight + Abstain Weight) ≥ 50% of Total SV Voting Weight

Pass: Yes Weight / (Yes Weight + No Weight) ≥ 66.7%

This preserves the spirit of the 2/3 supermajority on the binary decision while ensuring that engaged-but-undecided participation still allows governance to function. It also produces a healthier signal: an SV that shows up and Abstains contributes to the legitimacy of the result without skewing it. If Abstain does not count towards the Quorum then essentially it can become possible to block proposals with a “neutral” vote. If an SV shows up to vote it would make sense to let that vote count towards the threshold. Imo it's better if people vote No rather than Abstain. In case a proposal fails due to too many Abstain votes, it can be difficult to understand the exact reason for the failed proposal unless explicit reasoning is given by all the Abstain votes, and even then it would be more qualitative than quantitative. 

3. Open delegation to Recognized Delegates

v0.2 restricts delegation to other SVs. We'd suggest revisiting this for three reasons:

It concentrates rather than decentralizes. A popular SV becomes a delegation magnet, accumulating voting influence beyond its own stake without proportionate accountability.

It excludes the natural professional delegate market. Mature governance ecosystems (Uniswap, Optimism, Arbitrum, Compound, MakerDAO) all support delegation to non-stakeholder professional delegates — governance specialist firms, professional services firms, independent institutional advisors. These delegates publish voting platforms, maintain voting records, and bring deliberative bandwidth that operator-SVs might not have time for. Canton's institutional positioning makes this constituency a particularly natural fit.

It pushes operators into a role they aren't optimized for. SVs are infrastructure operators with commercial books of business. Their incentive structure in governance is inherently weighted toward their own business interests rather than the broader health of the network. A complementary class of governance-focused participants strengthens the system.

Professional delegates heightens Governance Maturity and Participation Organizations that focus on governance dedicates a lot more time to scaling the governance operations of the protocols, most of the governance systems in Web3 relies heavily on delegates as the stewards of the governance ecosystem. 

Suggested amendment:

An SV may delegate its Voting Weight to (i) another SV, or (ii) a Recognized Delegate.

Recognized Delegates are entities approved through a public application process administered by the Foundation, which may include (but is not limited to) professional services firms, governance specialist firms, and independent institutional advisors. Recognized Delegates must:

• Publish a public delegate platform and a continuous voting record

• Be subject to the same participation requirements as SVs

• Be removable from the Recognized Delegate registry by SV-weighted vote

This is also a natural place to import the Foundation-delegation practice common in mature governance systems, whereby Foundation-held weight is delegated to a diverse slate of Recognized Delegates rather than exercised directly. We'd be interested in the community's view on whether that practice is in scope for this CIP or better treated separately.

It should also be noted that of course it is completely up to the SV’s if they want to delegate to professional delegates, and they would only achieve any voting power in case the SV’s trust them enough to delegate to them. On top of that delegations can be removed at any given moment so in case a professional delegate acts out of their scope then the SVs can just remove their voting power. 

Happy to take any questions / conversations about the topics that I have brought forward here. 

On the 200m cap: we propose loosening it, either by raising the ceiling to 350m or by replacing the single cap with a tiered schedule (after vesting discount): full weight on the first 200m of locked CC, then 25% credit from 200m to 600m, 15% from 600m to 1b, and 10% above 1b.

For example, a standalone SV with 750m CC locked lands at 322.5m of voting weight under the tiered schedule:

• First 200m at 100% → 200m
• Next 400m (200m to 600m) at 25% → 100m
• Final 150m (600m to 750m) at 15% → 22.5m

The 200m cap too strictly decouples an SV's actual lock-in and time commitment from its voting share. Raising the cap or moving to a tapered schedule still keeps the largest holders heavily compressed relative to their total stake, while retaining a governance incentive to deepen commitment beyond the current cap. It also keeps a clear path toward decentralization as the network matures.

A question on the Operator Governance CIP: since Operators are an elected set of self-operated SVs, does that necessarily leave a set of self-operated SVs that don't hold an Operator seat? If so, it may be worth considering whether we should distinguish between self-operated non-Operator SVs and Operator SVs with regards to SV Voting Weight.

Best,

Billy Goodwin | Associate, Digital Assets

245 Park Avenue • New York, NY 10167
billy.goodwin@...

Hi everyone,

From our position operating a "Tier-1" Super Validator with weight 10, which has been live since November 2025, I wanted to highlight a practical concern with the proposed fixed 350M token threshold (or any similar fixed-cap accumulation model) for governance weight or privileges.

Even with one of the highest weights in the network, it would take us approximately 5 years to accumulate 350M tokens under current reward rates. With the continued onboarding of new SVs, this timeline is likely to extend substantially. This structure inherently advantages SVs who joined before 2026 and creates an uneven playing field that does not scale fairly with network growth.Proposed alternative mechanismWe suggest that governance weight, voting privilege, and priority should primarily derive from the percentage of the 30% liquid portion of rewards that each SV voluntarily locks in perpetuity, rather than from accumulating a large fixed token amount. Under the framework established in CIP-0105, SVs already receive rewards structured such that a significant portion (typically 70%) is locked to maintain full weight, leaving a 30% liquid component available to the operator.

We propose to tie additional or core governance influence directly to what percentage of that 30% liquid share an SV chooses to lock long-term. Key benefits of this approach:

• Removes early-mover bias: Newer SVs are not structurally disadvantaged by needing years to catch up on a fixed nominal threshold. Weight scales with commitment rather than tenure alone.
• Stronger alignment with network growth: Locking more of the liquid portion demonstrates skin-in-the-game and long-term alignment. While selling liquid rewards is rational for operators, it can be misaligned with the broader ecosystem. This mechanism rewards those who choose to further commit.
• Natural scaling: As the network grows and more rewards are earned, the liquid portion grows proportionally. Governance influence remains tied to ongoing commitment rather than hitting an arbitrary fixed cap.
• Incentivizes ecosystem alignment for all participants: Every SV starts from the same CIP-0105 structure. Those who lock a higher percentage of their liquid rewards gain proportionally higher voting weight/priority. This is transparent, merit-based on commitment, and applies equally regardless of when an SV joined.
• Complements existing mechanics: This can sit alongside or refine the current CIP-0105 locking framework without requiring a complete overhaul. The percentage locked from the liquid share could act as a multiplier or direct component in the weight calculation within the new governance drafts.

Suggested framing for the CIP:We could define SV governance weight / voting power as a function of:

“Base weight (per existing CIP-0105 mechanics) + additional governance multiplier based on the % of the 30% liquid reward portion that the SV voluntarily locks in perpetuity.”

Parameters such as the exact weighting curve or minimum lock thresholds could be set as adjustable governance parameters (subject to future CIPs with appropriate SV voting thresholds). This model keeps the system dynamic, fair, and strongly aligned with long-term network success.

I’m happy to discuss specific implementation details or help model how this could integrate with the voting and operating frameworks in the current drafts. We could also explore hybrid approaches that combine elements of percentage-of-earned and commitment-based locking.

Looking forward to the community’s thoughts and continued discussion on these important governance topics.

Best regards,
Heslin Kim
Zenith